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  Abstract 
Innovative firms typically have a high growth potential, need external funds to finance 
investment, and rely on the key effort and know-how of inside entrepreneurs. Given the 
limited amount of tangible assets and the non-contractible nature of entrepreneurial effort, 
these firms are often financially constrained. Access to external funds becomes an important 
factor in the expansion of innovative industries. This paper models a two sector economy of 
innovative and standard industries and shows how the pattern of comparative advantage is 
shaped by factor endowments and variables relating to corporate finance. In particular, a 
larger equity ratio of young entrepreneurial firms and tough corporate governance standards 
relax the financing constraints and create a comparative advantage in innovative industries.  
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JEL Classification 
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 1 Introduction
Countries diﬀer substantially in their innovation potential and market dominance in ad-
vanced sectors. Comparative advantage in innovative industries is not only a matter of
factor endowments but hinges as well on a number of fundamentals relating to corporate
ﬁnance and legal institutions. Firms in a country vary by their innovation potential and,
accordingly, face rather diﬀerent ﬁnancing constraints. We argue that young growth com-
panies are more innovative than larger ﬁrms with mature technologies, and have more
diﬃculty in attracting external funds to ﬁnance entry and expansion investment. The
notion that young entrepreneurial ﬁrms are particularly innovative is consistent with styl-
ized facts.1 For instance, the European Association for Bioindustries refers to innovative
ﬁrms as ones that are less than 15 years old and spend at least 15% of their expenditures
on R&D.2 Kortum and Lerner (2000) have shown that a Dollar of R&D spending in young
venture capital backed ﬁrms creates more patents and more radical innovations than the
same expenditure in other, typically more mature ﬁrms. They calculate that venture
capital ﬁnanced R&D accounts for roughly 14 percent of U.S. industrial innovation in
1998 although it amounts to only about 3 percent of all R&D funds. In general, venture
capitalists are specialized in ﬁnancing young ﬁrms in high technology sectors in their early
stages of business growth.
Because they are more innovative, young entrepreneurial ﬁrms have a large growth
potential and require substantial external funds. Using micro data, Aghion, Fally and
Scarpetta (2007) show that access to ﬁnance matters for the entry of small ﬁrms and
helps to expand new ﬁrms after successful start-up investment. In reviewing the litera-
ture, Hall (2002) emphasizes that small and new innovative ﬁrms experience high costs of
capital. Large and more mature ﬁrms, in contrast, prefer internal funds to ﬁnance their
investments. Aghion, Bond, Klemm and Marinescu (2004) report that larger, faster grow-
1See Prusa and Schmitz (1992). Gromb and Scharfstein (2003) provide a theory why incentives in
small ﬁrms are better.
2See www.europabio.org\articles\article275EN.
3ing, and more proﬁtable ﬁrms are more likely to issue new equity rather than new debt
as alternative sources for outside funds. They explain this by observing that young inno-
vative ﬁrms typically have little tangible assets so that outside investors tend to insist on
control rights over the ﬁrm’s decisions to protect themselved against entrepreneurial moral
hazard. For the same reason, equity or equity like instruments such as convertible debt
are commonly used in venture capital ﬁnancing, as documented in Kaplan and Ström-
berg (2003). Although we do not distinguish between new debt and equity as alternative
sources of outside funds and also do not speciﬁcally focus on venture capital ﬁnancing in
our theory, the evidence clearly points to the importance of ﬁnancing constraints rooted
in the special characteristics of innovative entrepreneurial ﬁrms: they have more attrac-
tive investment opportunities than less innovative ﬁrms and are more reliant on external
funds; they have a high proportion of intangibles such as knowledge and reputation and
have more specialized equipment with little collateral value; and there is a greater degree
of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders.3 We thus argue that ﬁnancing
frictions are an important factor to inﬂuence the process of creative destruction which is
so important for the expansion of innovative industries.
These ﬁndings suggest that corporate ﬁnance matters in shaping a country’s com-
parative advantage in innovative industries. Innovative ﬁrms have typically large market
potential, need external funds on top of own equity to ﬁnance investment, and depend
on the critical know-how of innovating entrepreneurs. These insiders often pursue non-
ﬁnancial objectives (private beneﬁts) that are in conﬂict with the return expectations
3Also work in business economics indicates that ﬁnancial constraints and governance are crucial for ﬁrm
creation and innovations (see Markman, Balkin, and Schjoedt, 2001). Baldwin and Gellatly (2004) argue
that ﬁnancing - together with management, human resources, and marketing - is among the core set of
“business skills” which determine the success of new companies through innovation and their performance
relative to others. Findings by Baek, Kang, and Park (2004) and Kamhampati (2006) support the view
that the relaxation of ﬁnancial constraints leads to eﬃciency gains at the ﬁrm level. For a large sample of
ﬁrms in the United Kingdom, Guariglia (2008) ﬁnds that ﬁnancial constraints are particularly important
for small and young ﬁrms and interprets this evidence as consistent with the hypothesis that these ﬁrms
“are more prone to facing asymmetric information problems” (ibid., p. 1805).
4of outside investors. The potential for opportunistic managerial behavior often restricts
external ﬁnancing and can result in credit rationing of proﬁtable investment. We argue
that incentive problems and ﬁnancing frictions are particularly severe in innovative sectors
so that the quality of corporate governance institutions (such as corporate transparency,
commercial law, investor protection etc.) are critical for the expansion of these sectors.
Investment subject to ﬁnancial constraints is a central theme in corporate ﬁnance (see
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; and Tirole, 2001; 2006). By way
of contrast, the nexus between corporate ﬁnance, innovation, and ﬁrm entry is hardly
recognized in international economics. An exception is Manova (2008) who ﬁnds empir-
ical support for the view that ﬁnancial constraints deter international trade. Manova
(2006) presents a model of trade with ﬁnancial constraints but they enter the analysis
similar to iceberg costs of trade and, hence, are exogenous unlike in our analysis. In trade
theory, the “classical” fundamentals determining a country’s international trade in com-
petitive markets are relative factor endowments and relative productivity across sectors.4
However, there is agreement that the traditional fundamental variables in trade are re-
lated systematically to net exports but explain only a small fraction of the sectoral trade
pattern (see Baldwin, 1971; and Treﬂer, 1993, 1995, for eminent examples, and Feenstra,
2004, for a survey of related work). Obvious candidates to explain net trade ﬂows beyond
factor endowments and technology are market imperfections and institutional character-
istics. Recent theoretical (Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2007; Melitz and
Ottaviano, 2008) and empirical research (Das, Tybout, and Roberts, 2007; Eaton, Eslava,
Kugler, and Tybout, 2008; Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008) emphasizes the role
of ﬁxed costs and the extensive margin of trade via ﬁrm entry and exit. However, unlike
in the literature on corporate ﬁnance, the coverage of these costs essentially depends on
endowment (mostly with assets embodied in labor) and is not endogenous to the model.
It is this paper’s task to develop a theoretical model motivating and explaining the
4Dixit and Norman (1980) or Helpman and Krugman (1985) illustrate that the fundamental insights
from classical and neo-classical trade theory — based on inﬁnitesimally small and perfectly competitive
ﬁrms — are still valid if ﬁrms entertain market power.
5role of endogenous ﬁnancial constraints and corporate governance for international trade.
Speciﬁcally, we explore how two new fundamental variables relating to corporate ﬁnance
aﬀect a country’s comparative advantage. We argue that own equity as a measure of
ﬁnancial robustness of ﬁrms and agency costs reﬂecting the presence of moral hazard
importantly aﬀect the ﬁnancing of entry and expansion investment of entrepreneurial
ﬁrms and thereby determine the growth of innovative industries. To link to classical trade
theory, we also explore the role of factor endowments in a ﬁnance constrained economy.
In our two sector model, we think of innovative goods to be intensive in entrepreneurial
labor inputs. As in Aghion and Tirole (1994), young and innovative companies heavily
rely on the managerial and technological inputs of their creators.5 These insiders are
not replaced without serious interruption of the ﬁrm.6 To assure incentives and prevent
opportunistic behavior, entrepreneurs must keep a substantial share of the proﬁt, giving
rise to agency costs. Agency costs limit the debt capacity of these ﬁrms and their ability
to raise outside funds. Due to agency costs, not all ﬁrms in need of external funding
are actually served. Moral hazard of entrepreneurial innovators thus introduces a market
imperfection in that ﬁrms may be denied credit and may not be able to enter the market,
despite of their investment generating a positive net present value.
By way of contrast, we think of the standard sector as being capital intensive. The
sector consists of more mature ﬁrms which have exploited their growth opportunities and
are not ﬁnance constrained. Production uses a standard technology, poses no particular
management problem and can be operated without frictions by other managers as well.
For the sake of simplicity, we adopt the extreme view that investment is not subject
to moral hazard and ﬁnancing constraints at all. The absence of ﬁnancing problems
5Early empirical work in trade pointed to the role of skilled workers in a sector for a country’s net
exports in that sector (see Baldwin, 1971). Recent work emphasizes entrepreneurial or managerial talent
(see Grossman and Helpman, 2004; Marin and Verdier, 2003, 2008) and the innovative capacity of young
ﬁrms (see Prusa and Schmitz, 1991; De Vet and Scott, 1992; for early examples).
6Quite similarly, Antras (2005) assumed that dismissal of a manager in a fully owned subsidiary leads
to an output loss. The control rights associated with ownership reduce this output loss, compared to the
loss from misbehavior in an independent outsourcing relationship.
6motivates our factor intensity assumption. It seems natural to assume the standard sector
to be capital intensive and the innovative sector to be intensive in entrepreneurial labor.
The novel treatment of corporate ﬁnance in a model of international trade leads to a
modiﬁcation of the core trade theorems such as the Stolper-Samuelson and the Rybczyn-
ski theorem. These theorems as well as comparative advantage in the innovative sector
depend on new and unexplored structural parameters of corporate ﬁnance: agency costs
of investment and the equity ratio of entrepreneurial ﬁrms. For instance, an increase in
the equity ratio as a measure of ﬁnancial robustness relaxes the ﬁnancing constraint on
innovative ﬁrms and allows ﬁrms with positive net present value to continue operations
which otherwise would have been denied the required loans and driven out of the market.
Similarly, in the spirit of the law and ﬁnance literature (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2000)
and La Porta et al. (2006), we argue that tough corporate governance standards and legal
rights of external investors limit the scope for managerial discretion and moral hazard. In
reducing agency costs, they relax ﬁrms’ external ﬁnancing constraints. These are novel
propositions in trade theory while the standard results on factor endowments continue to
hold in slightly modiﬁed form.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyzes the role of corporate ﬁnance for a country’s industry structure. Sec-
tion 4 explores the impact of fundamental corporate ﬁnance parameters on comparative
advantage and goods trade. The paper concludes with a summary of the key ﬁndings.
2 A Model of Trade and Finance
2.1 Basic Assumptions
Consider a world economy with two countries, two goods and two factors. Goods are
distinguished by their innovative content. An innovative industry produces new goods
with a technology that intensively uses the innovators’ key knowhow. The success of the
7company depends importantly on the managerial eﬀort of the entrepreneurial innovator.
In producing knowledge intensive goods, these ﬁrms need to invest substantially to exploit
their commercial potential. Typically, the ﬁrm’s own equity is not enough to ﬁnance
investment so that the ﬁrm relies on external ﬁnancing. However, external ﬁnancing
is diﬃcult because of managerial moral hazard. Having ﬁrm speciﬁc knowledge, the
insiders cannot be replaced by external managers without serious disruptions to the ﬁrm’s
prospects. Their key role in the company’s development creates room for managerial
discretion and opportunism, allowing them to pursue other objectives in conﬂict with
external investors’ interest.7 The relationship between external investors and ﬁrms is
fraught by corporate governance problems which limit the extent of external ﬁnancing.
In short, ﬁrms in the innovative sector are young entrepreneurial growth companies subject
to ﬁnance constraints. We deﬁne a “growth company” in an innovative industry as a ﬁrm
(i) with potentially large market opportunities due to the innovative nature of its business
model, (ii) in need of external ﬁnancing due to insuﬃcient own equity, and (iii) with a
key irreplaceable role of the innovating entrepreneur. The last trait creates a corporate
governance problem and ﬁnancing frictions when entrepreneurs have objectives (private
beneﬁts) diﬀerent from those of outside ﬁnanciers.
In contrast, ﬁrms in the traditional sector supply a standard good with a mature
technology. Therefore, managers can easily be replaced by outsiders. The potential for
managerial misbehavior is small, allowing external investors to commit a large amount of
capital. We take the distinction to the extreme and assume that moral hazard is absent
and external ﬁnancing is unconstrained in the traditional sector.8 Naturally, the tradi-
tional sector is capital intensive. In sum, we start from the assumption that innovative
industries are driven by young, entrepreneurial, ﬁnance constrained companies while tra-
7The surveys by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Tirole (2001) deﬁne corporate governance as “how to
get back your money”.
8One can also think of the sectoral segmentation resulting from a life-cycle of ﬁrms. Firms start
out small and ﬁnance constrained. As their technology matures, managerial moral hazard is narrowed
down and ﬁnance constraints become less tight. This story is similar to Antras’ (2005) argument about
changing headquarter intensity over a ﬁrm’s life-cycle.
8ditional industries are capital intensive and populated by ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms.
The economy’s total labor endowment is LT = L + 1, where L refers to natural
workers who can only work in the traditional sector. In addition, there is a mass one of
entrepreneurial innovators9 who either start a ﬁrm (share E) or work in the traditional
sector (share 1 − E). Occupational choice is limited only to agents with entrepreneurial
skills, while L is a sector speciﬁc endowment. Employment in the traditional sector is,
thus, L+1−E, while entrepreneurial labor allocated to the innovative sector is E, equal
to the number of ﬁrms started. A ﬁrm is managed by one entrepreneur. The economy’s
total capital endowment is AT = ALL+A and is distributed unevenly in the population.
All potential entrepreneurs are endowed with assets A per capita and all natural workers
with AL. This assumption allows for changes in aggregate capital without changing own
equity per ﬁrm. Alternatively, we can consider the role of capital distribution for a given
total asset endowment. Again, total assets will be allocated to the two sectors. The
entrepreneurial, innovative sector requires one unit of labor (entrepeneur) and a ﬁxed
amount of investment I per ﬁrm, or IE in total. Investment returns are uncertain.
Investment can succeed or fail and, if it is successful, the return can be higher or lower
which creates ﬁrm heterogeneity ex post.
Production in the innovative sector requires managerial eﬀort and a ﬁxed investment
I > A which exceeds the entrepreneur’s own equity A and yields an output x ∈ [0,∞) if
it is successful, and zero if it fails. Investment and production follow a logic sequence of
events: (i) Occupational choice with free entry; (ii) Productivity x of the ﬁrm becomes
known. The ﬁrm continues if the entrepreneur earns a positive surplus and is able to
attract external ﬁnancing. It closes down if x is too low and credit is denied; (iii) Having
obtained the required loan I − A, the entrepreneur manages the investment. She weighs
the monetary gains and potential private beneﬁts and chooses high or low eﬀort. With
high eﬀort, the ﬁrm succeeds with probability p and fails with probability 1−p. Output is
zero in case of business failure and all previous investment is lost. Shirking yields private
9We use the terms entrepreneurs, innovators, investors synonymuously.
9beneﬁts to the entrepreneur but results in a low success probability pL < p and, thus,
reduces expected income as well as repayment to the bank; (iv) If investment is success-
ful, the ﬁrm sells output x at the going market price v and repays external debt. The
entrepreneur collects residual proﬁt and spends all income on consumption. If investment
fails, output is zero, banks do not get repaid, and entrepreneurs have zero income.
Firm decisions in the innovative sector only involve discrete choice, starting with an
occupational choice in stage (i) where the entrepreneur irrevocably gives up an alternative
wage income w. Stage (ii) corresponds to a discrete continuation decision. If the ﬁrm is
stopped, the entrepreneur is still left with her assets A which she invests in the deposit
market at the going market rate of interest r to augment end of period consumption.
In stage (iii), the entrepreneur injects all her assets into the ﬁrm to reduce the need
for external ﬁnancing, and makes a discrete eﬀort choice. If at this stage the ﬁrm fails,
the entrepreneur is left with zero income because all her wealth is lost in the process of
bankruptcy. All agents are assumed risk neutral and are price takers with respect to w,
r, and v in a perfectly competitive market environment.
2.2 Finance Constrained Investment
External Financing: When an entrepreneur starts a company, she injects her wealth
as inside equity into the ﬁrm. Alternatively, she accepts employment in the traditional
sector and invests in the deposit market. The deposit interest factor is R = 1 + r, giving
the entrepreneur’s opportunity cost AR. Since required investment exceeds own equity,
a bank must ﬁnance the remaining part D = I − A, with cost R per unit of lending.
Given a loan rate i, the bank collects repayment (1 + i)D only if the ﬁrm is successful,
and nothing if it fails. The ﬁrm’s total surplus is split according to
π
e = p(xv − (1 + i)D) − AR,
π
b = p(1 + i)D − DR, D = I − A, (1)
π = pxv − IR.
10In the simple two state model, outside equity and outside debt are equivalent. Keeping
this in mind, we phrase the model in terms of external debt. With competitive banks, the
break even condition πb = 0 in bank lending implies (1 + i)p = R. The loan rate exceeds
the deposit rate by an intermediation margin which reﬂects the rate of business failure
and consequent credit losses, i > r.
In a ﬁrst best situation without moral hazard, shirking can be perfectly avoided and
ﬁrms can thus raise any amount of external funds without a ﬁnancing constraint. Banks
lend any amount, subject to break even rates (1 + i)p = R. A ﬁrm should continue if
investment I yields a positive surplus:
First Best: pxv ￿ IR ⇒ x ￿ x
FB
0 = IR/(pv) = (1 + i)I/v. (FB)
Credit Analysis: To go ahead with the venture, an entrepreneur must ask for a credit
D = I − A. With perfect competition, banks break even and the ﬁrm gets the entire
surplus. Having obtained credit, the entrepreneur chooses eﬀort. Anticipating high eﬀort,
banks oﬀer a competitive loan rate (1 + i)p = R but give credit only if the required
repayment is incentive compatible. In exerting full eﬀort, the entrepreneur assures a high
success probability p but she forgoes private beneﬁts, b = 0. When she is shirking and
enjoying private beneﬁts, b > 0, the success probability falls to pL < p. Shirking is avoided
only if the required repayment to the bank leaves a large enough share β
e = xv−(1 + i)D




e + b ⇔ β
e ￿ β ≡ b/(p − pL). (2)
To guarantee high eﬀort, the insider must receive at least β
e = xv − (1 + i)D ￿ β.
Pledgeable income is the maximum incentive compatible repayment xv − β that can
credibly be promised to the bank. The incentive income limits the repayment and, thereby,
bank lending to (1 + i)D ￿ vx−β. The lower the productivity draw x, the lower is output
and revenue xv, and the lower is pledgeable income. Even if the ﬁrm promises the entire
pledgeable income as repayment to the bank, (1 + i)D = vx−β, it may not be enough to
11allow the bank to break even. Hence, there is a lowest productivity draw where pledgeable
income just suﬃces to pay back. Combining with the bank’s break-even condition yields
the cut-oﬀ productivity
x0 =





Only projects with high return x > x0 are continued, less proﬁtable ventures are denied
credit and are closed down again. If the inequality would not hold, the ﬁrm would not
be ﬁnance constrained, and the continuation decision would be ﬁrst best. The problem
would be uninteresting. Hence, we assume
pβ > AR > 0, (A)
which says that the minimum incentive compatible compensation of the entrepreneur,
in expected value, exceeds the opportunity cost of her own equity. For all productivity
draws x > x0, the ﬁrm is given credit and allowed to continue. Due to (A), the threshold
productivity x0 yields a strictly positive surplus
π0 = pvx0 − IR = pβ − AR > 0. (4)
For slightly smaller x0, the innovator would still make a proﬁt but is denied credit. Hence,
the weakest ﬁrms with lowest productivity are credit constrained. Only ﬁrms with higher
productivity receive credit since they have enough pledgeable income. With bank proﬁts
remaining zero, the managerial incentive constraint becomes slack.
Free Entry/Start-up Investment: At the ﬁrst stage, productivity is not yet known.
Firms face a distribution G(x) =
  x
0 g(x′)dx′ with density g(x). From all productivity
draws, a fraction G(x0) will be stopped, either by the bank or because the entrepreneur is
unwilling to continue. From now on, we use the short-hand G0 ≡ G(x0) and g0 ≡ g(x0).
For all x > x0, proﬁts are strictly positive, π(x) = vpx − IR, and trivially increasing in
x. Expected proﬁt, conditional on getting ﬁnanced with x > x0, is deﬁned as













12With probability G0, entry results in so low a productivity that the ﬁrm is denied credit
and is shut down. The entrepreneur has already forgone a wage income but is still able
to earn AR by investing her assets in the deposit market rather than injecting them into
the ﬁrm. With probability 1 − G0, productivity is high enough to warrant continuation.
The ﬁrm invests own equity and gets a loan.
Entry must be decided one stage earlier before the actual productivity of the ﬁrm is
known. The expected net present value must be large enough to justify entry, i.e. to give
up alternative wage earnings w,
  πe = (1 − G0)     π ￿ w. (6)
Since π(x) = pvx − IR is the surplus over the endowment value AR, expected end of
period wealth from setting up the ﬁrm is y =   πe + AR. Employment in the standard
sector yields y = w + AR. Investors start a new venture in the innovative sector as long
as   πe ￿ w. Free entry eliminates rents, making the inequality binding.
2.3 Standard Sector
Firms in the standard sector use a linear homogeneous technology combining capital and
labor. To compare with innovative ﬁrms, suppose a ﬁrm is deﬁned by one unit of capital so
that aggregate investment K reﬂects an extensive margin only and is equal to the number
of ﬁrms. Suppose cash-ﬂow is φ per unit of capital. Assuming the same investment
risk, the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm is πN = pφ − R. It may be split among owners and
banks in the same way as in (1). Taking the extreme case that there are no agency costs
and ﬁnance constraints in the standard sector, the Modigliani Miller theorem renders
the distinction between internal and external funds irrelevant. Investment is, thus, at
the ﬁrst best level. Free entry implies pφ = R. Deﬁne the cash-ﬂow per unit of capital
by φ ≡ p−αf01α˜ l1−α − w˜ l which is available only if the initial investment was successful.
Multiplying the zero proﬁt condition by K and deﬁning aggregate employment by L = ˜ lpK
thus yields f0KαL1−α = wL + RK.
13Given linear homogeneity and absence of agency costs, production is analyzed in the
standard way. Denote capital and labor per unit of output by k and l. Cost minimization













Normalizing f0 = αα (1 − α)
1−α implies u = Rαw1−α = 1. With zero proﬁt, unit cost
must be equal to one when the standard is the numeraire. Hence, the factor price frontier
is w = R−α/(1−α). Since du/dw = l and du/dR = k, the slope w′ (R) = −k/l is equal
to the capital labor ratio. Substituting w into unit demands yields k = α/R and l =
(1 − α)/w(R). Introducing a sectoral index N, we summarize:
kN = αN/R, lN = (1 − αN)/w(R), w(R) = R
−αN/(1−αN), w
′ (R) = −kN/lN. (7)
2.4 Demand
Agents consume two goods and supply eﬀort. We assume preferences to be linear ho-
mogeneous in commodity consumption and separable with respect to eﬀort cost. Linear
homogeneity of u( ) implies risk-neutrality with respect to income. Linear separability
simpliﬁes the eﬀort problem. Eﬀort (foregone private beneﬁts bj) and income yj are
conditional on the type and sectoral activity of the agent. The consumer problem is
U = max
cjN,cjE,bj
u(cjN,cjE) + bj s.t. cjN + vcjE ≤ yj, (8)
where the lower index N,E denotes demand for standard and innovative goods by agent
j. The standard good (consumption cjN) is the numeraire, hence v is the relative price
of good cjE. Without loss of generality, we specify preferences to be Cobb Douglas,
u(cjN,cjE) = u0   (cjN)
1−γ (cjE)
γ , (9)
implying constant expenditure shares, vcjE = γyj and cjN = (1 − γ)yj.
2.5 Equilibrium
The economy’s labor endowment consists of a mass one of entrepreneurial agents and L
workers. Of all potential entrepreneurs, a part 1−E opts for employment in the traditional
14industry. The other part E starts a ﬁrm in the innovative sector. A fraction G0 is closed
again since productivity is too low. When an entrepreneur continues, the ﬁrm invests
capital I and, together with managerial eﬀort, produces expected output XE. The total
value of production is
Y = XN + v   XE, XE ≡ p  x   (1 − G0)E. (10)
Banks intermediate between savers and investors. All investment is ﬁnanced out of
the initial capital endowment AT = ALL + A. Asset endowment per worker AL and per
entrepreneur A diﬀer which allows for diﬀerent scenarios on equity capital per ﬁrm and the
aggregate endowment. An agent who prefers employment over entrepreneurship, invests
her full asset wealth in the deposit market, giving a supply (1 − E)A. The other part
E starts a ﬁrm in the innovative sector. A fraction G0 is closed again since productivity
is too low, leaving wealth A to be invested in the deposit market. The others continue
and invest equity A in their own ﬁrm, together with externally borrowed funds, to ﬁnance
investment. Equilibrium requires that demand and supply of loanable funds clear, ALL+
A(1 − E)+AG0E = (I − A)(1 − G0)E+kNXN, which gives AT = (1 − G0)IE+kNXN.
Dividing capital demand by total output in the entrepreneurial sector in (10) yields unit
capital demand kE. Labor market clearing is LT = L+1 = E +lNXN. Similarly deﬁning
unit labor demand lE gives the factor market conditions,
AT = kE   XE + kN   XN, kE ≡ I/(p  x),
LT = lE   XE + lN   XN, lE ≡ 1/[(1 − G0)p  x].
(11)
The L workers earn a wage w and interest on asset wealth, giving w+ALR per capita.
Part E of the entrepreneurial agents start a ﬁrm and expect end of period wealth   πe+AR
per capita where   πe is the expected surplus over asset wealth. The other part 1 − E
prefers working and gets w + AR. Occupational choice with free entry implies w =   πe
and yields aggregate income Y = (w + ALR)L + (w + AR)(1 − E) + (  πe + AR)E, or
Y = w   LT + R   AT. (12)
15Aggregate income equals the value of output in (10). To see this, note wlE + RkE = v
by replacing unit demands with the deﬁnitions in (11), inserting   πe = w and using (5-6).
Also note wlN + RkN = 1. Replacing factor endowments in (12) by (11) and using the
unit cost equations proves (10). National income is equal to the value of traditional and
innovative sector output.
Turning to the trade balance, observe that commodity demand follows from (8-9) and
depends individual income. A worker with wealth Aj earns w+AjR. An innovator closing
down early and investing in the deposit market earns AR while failing after investing in
one’s own ﬁrm leaves zero. Successful entrepreneurs get π(x) + AR, depending on real-
ized productivity. Since demand is linear, agent heterogeneity doesn’t matter. Demand
depends only on aggregate income in (12) and is CN = (1 − γ)Y and CE = γY/v. The
income expenditure identity CN + vCE = Y = XN + vXE yields the trade balance
(CN − XN) + v   (CE − XE) = 0. (13)
In the absence of international capital ﬂows, a trade surplus in innovative goods must be
oﬀset by a deﬁcit in traditional commodities.
We consider ﬁrst the small open economy with a ﬁxed prices v. The solution of the
model proceeds with the following steps: (i) Get the factor price changes by deriving a
modiﬁed version of the Stolper Samuelson theorem. (ii) Get the supply changes from
factor endowments (Rybczynski theorem) and from factor price changes. (iii) Compute
aggregate income from factor endowments and factor prices, and derive aggregate demand.
(iv) Get the impact on excess demand and the trade pattern.
3 Industrial Structure
To establish how corporate governance shapes comparative advantage in innovative indus-
tries, we ﬁrst turn to a small open economcy taking world goods prices as given. We ﬁrst
study how an increase in the world price v of innovative goods aﬀects factor prices. We
16thus reestablish the Stolper Samuelson theorem in an economy with ﬁnance constrained
ﬁrms. Second, we consider an increase in the economy’s total capital endowment AT,
keeping constant the inside equity A of ﬁrms. In this scenario, the endowment comes
from more assets of workers which does not directly aﬀect the borrowing needs of entre-
preneurial ﬁrms. We then establish a modiﬁed version of the Rybczynski theorem in the
presence of credit rationing. Then we turn to aspects of corporate ﬁnance. The third sce-
nario considers an increase in inside equity A which determines the ﬁnancial strength and
robustness of innovative ﬁrms, keeping constant aggregate capital endowment AT. Hence,
the scenario considers an increase in A which is compensated by a reduction in AL. This
experiment can also be interpreted as moving to a more uneven distribution of the capital
endowment among workers and potential entrepreneurs. We ﬁnd that not only the level
but also the distribution of capital endowment is important! Finally, we turn to the role
of legal institutions. The empirical law and ﬁnance literature has emphasized the impor-
tance of tight investor protection, commercial law for increased corporate transparency
to outside investors etc. These regulations determine the quality of corporate governance
which limits managerial autonomy and discretion, make managers more accountable to
outside stakeholders, and thereby reduce agency costs and facilitate external ﬁnancing.
We interpret better governance as a reduction in the private beneﬁts β of shirking.
3.1 Unit Demands
Unit factor demands importantly depend on cost shares which reﬂect the factor intensity
assumptions. We have argued in the introductory section that the ﬁnance constrained
innovative sector is intensive in (entrepreneurial) labor and the traditional sector is capital
intensive. In the traditional sector, unit cost is wlN+RkN = 1, with cost shares αN = RkN
and 1 − αN = wlN. With free entry, unit cost in the innovative sector must be equal
to the output price, wlE + RkE = v, see (12). The average share of capital cost is
αE = RkE/v = IR/(vp  x) where the second equality uses the deﬁnition of unit demand in
(11). The share of ‘entrepreneurial labor cost’ is 1−αE = wlE/v =   π/(vp  x). The second
17equality again substitutes (11) and notes the occupational choice condition w = (1 − G0)   π
which states that proﬁt income must ultimately be large enough to compensate for the
outside option in the traditional sector. To check consistency, add up the cost shares
and get vp  x = IR +   π as in (5). Hence, the average value of output per ﬁrm in the
innovative industry consists of the cost of capital plus the average expected proﬁt required
to compensate the entrepreneurial labor input.
To analyze comparative statics, we take log-diﬀerentials. The hat notation indi-
cates relative changes such as ˆ x0 ≡ dx0/x0. Exceptions are explicitely mentioned. The
continuation decision in (3) determines the threshold value x0, giving vpx0 (ˆ x0 + ˆ v) =
DR ˆ R − AR ˆ A + βpˆ β in diﬀerential form. Divide by the value of output, use the cost
share αE deﬁned above, and denote the debt asset ratio of the ﬁrm by δ ≡ D/I and,
correspondingly, the equity ratio by 1 − δ = A/I,
x0
  x
  ˆ x0 = δαE   ˆ R − (1 − δ)αE   ˆ A −
x0
  x
  ˆ v +
β
v  x
  ˆ β. (14)
A higher deposit rate R makes credit rationing more severe and drives the weakest ﬁrms
out of business, i.e. a higher threshold productivity is required to obtain credit. A higher
price boosts revenues and pledgeable income which relaxes the credit constraint and allows
weaker ﬁrms to continue. Higher own equity A as a measure of ﬁnancial strength reduces
the need for external funding and allows for a lower threshold. Note that β/(v  x) expresses
the agency cost as a share of the output value of the average ﬁrm.
A higher threshold productivity raises average productivity of innovative ﬁrms by
    x =




  ˆ x0. (15)
Unit factor demands in the entrepreneurial sector are deﬁned in (11) and exclusively
depend on the threshold value x0,
ˆ kE = −









  ˆ x0. (16)













, ˆ kE = −
  x − x0
x0
  ˆ lE. (17)
18In the traditional sector, unit demands adjust according to (7),
ˆ kN = − ˆ R, ˆ lN = −ˆ w =
αN
1 − αN
  ˆ R. (18)
3.2 Factor Prices
With free entry, unit cost in both sectors is equal to the output price, RkE +wlE = v and
RkN + wlN = 1. Log-diﬀerentiating these conditions yields
ˆ v = αE
 
ˆ R + ˆ kE
 
+ (1 − αE)
 





ˆ R + ˆ kN
 
+ (1 − αN)
 
ˆ w + ˆ lN
 
.
Use (18) and get αNˆ kN +(1 − αN)ˆ lN = 0. The same does not hold for the entrepreneurial
sector because factor use is distorted on account of the ﬁnance constraint. Use (16) and
the deﬁnitions αE and π0 to get [note x0 − αE  x = π0/(vp)]
αEˆ kE + (1 − αE)ˆ lE =




ˆ x0 =  
x0
  x






This term would be zero in a ﬁrst best world with πFB
0 = 0, see (FB). In a credit
constrained economy, the marginal ﬁrm makes a positive proﬁt π0 > 0, indicating that
entry is too small. The parameter   may, thus, be seen as a measure of the capital market
distortion due to moral hazard which is small if either π0 (deviation from the ﬁrst best) or
the density of ﬁrms near the threshold level is small. Since x0 rises with R, this term acts
to magnify the eﬀect of a higher capital cost R on the output price. Using (19) together
with (14) yields

 αN 1 − αN


















v¯ x ˆ β + (1 − δ)αE  ˆ A

.
Given that the traditional sector is capital intensive and the innovative sector inten-
sive in (entrepreneurial) labor, the determinant must be positive, λα = αN − αE −
(1 − αN) δαE > 0. In the ﬁrst best case with   = 0, the standard condition would
be αN > αE. With ﬁnance constraints, the condition becomes more stringent: λα > 0
19requires (αN − αE)/[(1 − αN)αE] >  δ ￿ 0. The larger the ﬁnancing frictions, the more
capital intensive the traditional sector must be to guarantee λα > 0. We thus assume the
deviation from the ﬁrst best to be not too large. Inverting the system yields the solution
ˆ R = −εRv   ˆ v + εRβ   ˆ β − εRA   ˆ A, ˆ w = −
αN
1 − αN
  ˆ R, (20)














 , εRA ≡
1 − αN
λα
(1 − δ)αE .
Proposition 1 (Stolper Samuelson) (a) If the innovative sector is intensive in (man-
agerial) labor (λα > 0), a higher price reduces interest and raises wages: ˆ R < 0 < ˆ w.
(b) More ﬁnancial strength (own equity ˆ A > 0) and better governance (agency costs ˆ β < 0)
of ﬁrms in the innovative sector aﬀect factor prices qualitatively in the same way.




1 +  x0
¯ x
 
> 1. Substituting λα and rearranging, this condition is equivalent to
 x0
¯ x αN > 0 > −[1 + (1 − αN) δ]αE and is naturally fulﬁlled.
The statement on ﬁnancial strength stems from the scenario that the total capital
endowment is kept constant, i.e. the asset endowment of workers is simultaneously reduced
when potential entrepreneurs are endowed with more assets, ˆ A > 0 > ˆ AL. Hence, in
essence, the statement about the ﬁnancial strength of ﬁrms is a statement about the
distribution of ﬁnancial wealth in the economy. The importance of this distributional
result is new in trade theory. Assuming that it is the more wealthy people who start a
ﬁrm, A > AL, we could say that a more unequal distribution of the asset endowment
boosts interest and reduces wages, thus reinforcing inequality.
How exactly does ﬁnancial robustness change factor prices? When new ﬁrms in the
innovative industry come with more equity, they need less external funds to ﬁnance the
required capital investment. Therefore, some marginal ﬁrms which were previously denied
credit, are now able to obtain a loan if their balance sheet improves. Having more own
20equity, they require a smaller loan so that pledgeable income is enough to repay the credit.
Along with a lower productivity of the marginal ﬁrm, average productivity   x declines as
well. Capital demand per unit of output, kE = I/(p  x), rises. The marginal ﬁrm uses
the same investment but produces much less output than other ﬁrms so that unit capital
demand rises when more ﬁrms at the low productivity margin are ﬁnanced. When a ﬁrm
has more equity and credit rationing is relaxed, an entrepreneur is allowed to continue
more often and, thus, produces more output per unit of labor. Equivalently, labor demand
per unit of output falls. With unit capital demand rising and unit labor demand falling,
unit cost equal to the output price v in zero proﬁt equilibrium, can only remain constant
when interest falls and the wage rate rises.
When agency costs β increase due to weaker corporate governance standards and
more severe moral hazard, it becomes more costly to compensate entrepreneurs for their
managerial eﬀort. Pledgeable income shrinks and debt capacity of ﬁrms declines. Banks
can no longer expect credible repayment from some marginal ﬁrms and will deny credit.
Therefore, start-ups are terminated more often, the productivity x0 of the marginal ﬁrm
increases which, in turn, yields higher average productivity. Therefore, capital demand
per unit of industry output falls and unit labor demand rises. Given a constant output
price, unit cost is ﬁxed in zero proﬁt equilibrium, requiring a rise in interest and a decline
in the wage rate, see (20).
Figure 1 depicts the solution in the factor price space and illustrates the modiﬁed
Stolper Samuelson theorem. The two curves are the sectoral zero proﬁt conditions. The
comparative statics is determined by the system following (19). For a given output price,
entrepreneurial ﬁrms make a larger proﬁt when they are ﬁnancially stronger and need less
outside funding ( ˆ A > 0). To lure away more entrepreneurial agents from employment in
the traditional sector, innovative sector ﬁrms compete up the wage rate until proﬁts are
zero. The unit cost curve shifts to the right. When labor gets more scarce and expensive,
the traditional sector must shrink. Being capital intensive, it releases relatively more
capital than labor. Given a higher wage rate, interest must fall until traditional sector
21ﬁrms can break even. A lower interest, however, boosts proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms, allowing
them to compensate entrepreneurs for an even higher wage. The process continues until,
in the new intersection in Figure 1, ﬁrms in both sectors are on their cost curves and
simultaneously break even at a lower interest and higher wage. Lower agency costs or a



























Fig. 1: Financial Robustness, Agency Costs and the Stolper Samuelson Theorem
3.3 Sectoral Outputs
The Rybczynski theorem of classical trade theory explains a country’s sectoral structure
in terms of factor endowments, AT = ALL+A and LT = L+1 in the present case. With
an increase in total asset endowment we mean an endowment of workers only, keeping the
equity ratio of ﬁrms in the innovative industry constant. Log-diﬀerentiating the factor
market conditions in (11) yields
ˆ AT − ˆ k = sA ˆ XE + (1 − sA) ˆ XN, ˆ k = sAˆ kE + (1 − sA)ˆ kN, sA = kEXE/AT, (21)
ˆ LT − ˆ l = sL ˆ XE + (1 − sL) ˆ XN, ˆ l = sLˆ lE + (1 − sL)ˆ lN, sL = lEXE/LT.
In a ﬁrst step, we hold product prices as well as own equity A and agency costs β of
innovative ﬁrms constant which implies that factor prices remain constant as well. Hence,
22unit factor demands remain in variant, ˆ kj = ˆ lj = 0. The determinant of the system,
sA − sL, is negative and λs = sL − sA > 0, if the innovative sector is labor intensive and,
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ˆ LT − ˆ l
  
.
The magniﬁcation eﬀect results in ˆ XE =
1−sA
sL−sA
ˆ LT > ˆ LT and ˆ XN =
sL
sL−sA
ˆ AT > ˆ AT.
Proposition 2 (Rybczynski) If the innovative sector is labor intensive, an increased
labor endowment expands the innovative sector (using entrepreneurial labor intensively)
and contracts the capital intensive standard sector.
Next, we turn to the impact of changes in output prices and the structural parameters
(ﬁnancial strength and governance of ﬁrms) that characterize the innovative sector. Unit
factor demand in the innovative sector depends on ˆ x0 only, see (16). We thus need to
evaluate the change in the threshold productivity in (14). Substituting the change in the
interest rate given in (20) yields
x0
  x












  ˆ β − (εRAδ + 1 − δ)αE   ˆ A. (23)
The eﬀect of a higher price is to allow some marginal ﬁrms to continue which would
otherwise have been ﬁnance constrained. Increased ﬁnancial strength has the same ef-
fect. Observe that a lower threshold value also erodes the average productivity   x in the
innovative sector. The marginal and ﬁnancially weakest ﬁrms are the least productive.
When more of them continue, because a higher price or more own equity boosts their debt
capacity and relaxes the ﬁnancing constraint, average productivity declines.10 However,
one must be reminded that even marginal ﬁrms generate a positive net present value to
society when entry is ﬁnance constrained. The decline in average productivity is, thus, not
10This is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding of Lerner (2002) that venture capital backed investments
are less productive and generate less value added in boom periods when the industry expands.
23to be seen as damaging. Quite to the contrary, since entry is ﬁnance constrained, more
entry is an improvement. Finally, higher agency costs tighten the ﬁnancing constraint
and lead to a higher threshold productivity needed for continuation.
Unit factor demands in the innovative sector depend on the change in factor prices via
their impact on the threshold productivity while unit demands in the traditional sector
depend on factor prices as in standard cost minimization. Armed with these results, we
evaluate the change in unit factor demands in (21) by ﬁrst substituting (17-18), collecting
terms and ﬁnally replacing ˆ R with (20). After some computations,
ˆ k = εkv   ˆ v + εkA   ˆ A − εkβ   ˆ β, ˆ l = −εlv   ˆ v − εlA   ˆ A + εlβ   ˆ β, (24)
where the elasticity parameters are again deﬁned with positive values,
εkv ≡ sA
(  x − x0)g0
1 − G0









(  x − x0)g0
1 − G0









(  x − x0)g0
1 − G0








According to proposition 1, a higher price of innovative goods reduces interest and
boosts the wage rate since the innovative sector is assumed to be labor intensive. Both
work to augment unit capital demand and reduce unit labor demand. Higher own equity of
innovative ﬁrms tilts the factor price frontier in the same way, yielding the same change in
unit factor demands while higher agency costs induce the opposite adjustment. Combining
24(22) and (24), we can derive the impact on sectoral output,
λs ˆ XE = (1 − sA) ˆ LT − (1 − sL) ˆ AT + [(1 − sA)εlv + (1 − sL)εkv]   ˆ v
: +[(1 − sA)εlA + (1 − sL)εkA]   ˆ A − [(1 − sA)εlβ + (1 − sL)εkβ]   ˆ β, (25)
λs ˆ XN = sL ˆ AT − sAˆ LT − [sLεkv + sAεlv]   ˆ v
: −[sLεkA + sAεlA]   ˆ A + [sLεkβ + sAεlβ]   ˆ β.
Note that all coeﬃcients are deﬁned positive, i.e. λs > 0. Apart from the Rybczynski
eﬀects in Proposition 2, we have
Proposition 3 (Supply Changes) The innovative sector expands when the output price
rises (ˆ v > 0), ﬁrms are ﬁnancially more robust ( ˆ A > 0), and corporate governance
improves (ˆ β < 0).
Aggregate supply importantly depends on the number of entrants E and the number
of mature ﬁrms M ≡ (1 − G0)E which are continued beyond the initial start-up phase.
Using (10-11), we can relate the changes in ﬁrm numbers to changes in aggregate supply
according to E = lEXE and M = kEXE/I, yielding ˆ E = ˆ lE + ˆ XE and ˆ M = ˆ kE + ˆ XE.
First, pure endowment eﬀects at a constant output price v leaves factor prices and unit
demands unchanged. Therefore, a larger labor endowment leads to an expansion of the
innovative industry which exclusively occurs on the extensive margin, raising both the
number of entrants and mature ﬁrms. The cut-oﬀ and average productivities remain
constant. How does a higher market price expand the innovative sector? By the Stolper
Samuelson theorem, interest declines while the wage rate increases. Both adjustments
relax the ﬁnancing constraint, allow more marginal ﬁrms to continue and, thereby, reduce
average productivity. By (16), a lower cut-oﬀ productivity raises unit capital demand
and squeezes unit labor demand, ˆ kE > 0 > ˆ lE. Clearly, a higher output price raises the
number of mature ﬁrms in the innovative sector while the number of entrants becomes
ambiguous. Hence, the expansion is shifted from the extensive (number of entrants) to
the intensive margin (increased continuation rate).
253.4 Demand Side
Consumer demand for innovative goods is CE = γ Y/v and depends on aggregate income
as noted in (12). Given an asset income share ω ≡ RAT/Y , higher factor income raises
aggregate spending by ˆ Y = ω
 
ˆ R + ˆ AT
 
+ (1 − ω)
 
ˆ w + ˆ LT
 
. Substituting the factor
price changes in (20) yields




The sign of θ reﬂects our factor intensity assumptions. When the traditional industry
is capital intensive, we must have αN > ω > αE, i.e. the income share of capital is
larger in the traditional sector than in the economy at large.11 The average share, in
turn, exceeds the share of capital income in the innovative industry which is populated by
young entrepreneurial companies with most of the return being a reward for managerial
labor inputs (wage opportunity cost of entrepreneurship). The factor price frontier reﬂects
cost minimization in the traditional, capital intensive sector. Given the factor intensity
assumption, a higher interest and, correspondingly, a lower wage rate erode aggregate
income. Substituting the equilibrium interest rate in (20) yields
ˆ Y = ω   ˆ AT + (1 − ω)   ˆ LT + θεRv   ˆ v − θεRβ   ˆ β + θεRA   ˆ A. (27)
A higher world price for innovative goods raises aggregate income. Part of it reﬂects
the fact that a higher price boosts pledgeable income and helps the expansion of ﬁnance
constrained entrepreneurial ﬁrms in the innovative sector. The elasticity εRv deﬁned in
(20) is magniﬁed by the parameter   which parameterizes the tightness of the ﬁnancing
constraint. This parameter is deﬁned in (19) and would be zero in a ﬁrst best world
where continuation occurs until proﬁt of the marginal ﬁrm is driven down to zero. For
the same reasons, the equity ratio of ﬁrms and agency costs are relevant only in a ﬁnance
11To prove this, multiply (11) by R and use αE = RkE/v and αN = RkN, giving RAT = αEvXE +
αNXN. Dividing by Y and noting vCE = vXE = γY and CN = XN = (1 − γ)Y under balanced trade
gives ω = γαE + (1 − γ)αN.
26constrained economy with   > 0. In the ﬁrst best, the interest elasticities in (27) with
respect to these parameters would be zero.
Given that young entrepreneurial growth companies in innovative industries tend to
be ﬁnance constrained, a larger equity ratio of ﬁrms (higher A) which characterizes ﬁ-
nancially more robust ﬁrms with stronger balance sheets, raises aggregate income. The
reason is that a larger equity ratio facilitates external funding of investments with strictly
positive net present value (π0 > 0 at the margin). With lower equity, a larger credit is
needed. These marginal ﬁrms would be denied credit since the given pledgeable income
would not suﬃce to repay the larger required loan. Finally, bad legal institutions also
reduce aggregate income. Inadequate corporate governance standards make insiders more
autonomous and less accountable to outside investors. Such institutions invite manage-
rial misbehavior and opportunism and, thereby, raise the agency costs of investment β
in innovative industries which intensively rely on entrepreneurial inputs. Larger agency
costs reduce pledgeable income and, thereby, the debt capacity of these ﬁrms.
Aggregate income and relative prices determine demand for innovative goods,
ˆ CE = ˆ Y − ˆ v = ω   ˆ AT + (1 − ω)   ˆ LT − (1 − θεRv)   ˆ v − θεRβ   ˆ β + θεRA   ˆ A, (28)
where 1 − θεRv = [ω − αE −     (δαE (1 − αN) + (αN − ω)x0/  x)]/λα uses the deﬁnitions
of εRv, θ and λα. The factor intensity assumption implies αN > ω > αE. We argue for
1 > θεRv which is fulﬁlled if ﬁnance constraints are not too tight and   is close to zero.
In this case, a higher output price restrains demand. Note that, even with a degenerate
demand reaction, excess demand for innovative goods would still decline with a higher
own price as long as the supply change dominates.
3.5 Trade Balance
Excess demand in the domestic economy, ζE ≡ CE−XE, results in a trade balance deﬁcit
for innovative goods. Consistent with both autarky and perfectly symmetric countries,
we evaluate comparative static eﬀects at the point where ζE = 0. In particular, we are
27interested in how the trade balance in innovative goods responds to changes in the novel
fundamental parameters introduced by our analysis: the abundance of total assets AT in
the economy, the ﬁnancial robustness of innovative ﬁrms measured by A at given AT, and
the extent of agency costs as captured by β. The associated comparative static eﬀects
involve ˆ ζE = ˆ CE − ˆ XE for the domestic economy. Substituting (28) and (25) yields
ˆ ζE = −εZv   ˆ v + εZAT   ˆ AT − εZL   ˆ LT − εZA   ˆ A + εZβ   ˆ β, (29)
where coeﬃcients are deﬁned as [use λs = sL − sA > 0 when necessary]
εZAT ≡
























In restricting ourselves to a neighborhood of the ﬁrst best equilibrium, the elasticities
are all positive, despite of the countervailing inﬂuence of the terms associated with θ. To
see this, note the assumption (A) in section 2.2 which implies that ﬁnance constraints are
binding. Hence, some ﬁrms with positive net present value are rationed. The marginal ﬁrm
makes a strictly positive proﬁt π0, leading to   > 0. Letting the agency cost approach the
borderline case from above, βp → AR, implying π0 → 0 and   → 0, moves the equilibrium
arbitrarily close to the ﬁrst best. In fact, the ﬁrst best equilibrum is well deﬁned although
the size of own equity and agency costs have no inﬂuence on the equilibrium in this case.
By the Modigliani Miller theorem, the distinction between external debt and own equity
become irrelevant in a ﬁrst best world. All terms multiplying with   drop out, leaving the
classic two sector trade model with the Modigliani Miller theorem applying to investment
ﬁnancing in both sectors. Letting private beneﬁts of shirking and, thus, agency costs
only marginally exceed the borderline case of assumption (A), we keep close to the ﬁrst
best. Consider now, for example, the elasticity εZβ stated above. Since   → 0 implies
εRβ → 0, the last term vanishes while the elasticities εlβ and εkβ listed in (24) remain
28strictly positive where the debt and equity ratios δ and 1−δ are exogenous to the model.
The same holds for the other elasticities in (29) as long as we restrict ourselves to a
neighborhood of the ﬁrst best.
Suppose the allocation is close to ﬁrst best and trade is balanced in the initial equilib-
rium. When the economy gets richer in ﬁnancial assets, it starts to develop a surplus in
the traditional capital intensive sector while the innovative sector relying intensively on
entrepreneurial inputs records an excess demand, resulting in a trade deﬁcit. Given that
demand declines in its own price (1 > θεRv), a higher output price of innovative goods
expands output and results in a trade surplus in this sector (sectoral excess demand
falls). Finally, higher agency costs lead to a trade deﬁcit in innovative goods. When en-
trepreneurial ﬁrms are endowed with stronger balance sheets, the entrepreneurial sector
expands, resulting in a trade surplus in innovative goods.
4 Comparative Advantage
In the following analysis, we study three scenarios: autarky where v is endogenous and
depends on domestic variables only, the case with two large countries where v is jointly
determined by domestic and foreign fundamentals, and a scenario of a small open economy
with exogenous v when the number of symmetric countries is large.




  ˆ AT −
εZL
εZv
  ˆ LT −
εZA
εZv
  ˆ A +
εZβ
εZv
  ˆ β. (30)
Since in (29), εZAT = εZL, the price change ˆ v is homogeneous of degree zero with respect
to a ceteris paribus proportional change ˆ AT = ˆ LT of capital and labor endowments. This
holds despite of the fact that the number of potential entrepreneurs is held ﬁxed. How-
ever, while natural workers can only be employed in the traditional sector, entrepreneurs
can perform both tasks. In an interior equilibrium, more entrepreneurship means less
29employment in the traditional sector and conversely. The free entry, occupational choice
condition means that (entrepreneurial) labor is reallocated freely across sectors, and so is
ﬁnancial capital. A ceteris paribus increase in own equity of new ﬁrms, ˆ A > 0, relaxes
the ﬁnancing constraint and expands the innovative industry, leading to excess demand
and requiring a lower relative price.12 Lower agency costs in ﬁnancing entrepreneurship
(ˆ β < 0), for example due to improved corporate governance standards or ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, favor expansion in the innovative sector and also reduce the output price. Lower
agency costs relax the incentive constraint and boost pledgeable income, allowing more
of the marginal ﬁrms to be ﬁnance which otherwise would have been credit constrained.
Two Large Countries: Let us focus on parameter domains with imperfect special-
ization so that production of both innovative and standard goods takes place in either
country also after changing fundamental parameters. Assume that countries are perfectly
symmetric initially. Use a star to denote foreign variables and assume that the coeﬃcients
in (29) are symmetric across countries. Hence, foreign excess demand changes by
ˆ ζ
⋆
E ≡ ˆ C
⋆
E − ˆ X
⋆
E = −εZv   ˆ v + εZAT   ˆ A
⋆
T − εZL   ˆ L
⋆
T − εZA   ˆ A
⋆ + εZβ   ˆ β
⋆
, (31)
with ˆ v = ˆ v⋆. The change in the two economies’ excess demands for innovative goods must
add up to zero for the world market of innovative goods to clear,
ˆ ζE + ˆ ζ
⋆
E = −2εZv   ˆ v + εZAT  
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: −εZA  
 
ˆ A + ˆ A
⋆
 
+ εZβ  
 
ˆ β + ˆ β
⋆ 
= 0.
Consider the comparative static eﬀects of changes in domestic fundamentals, keeping
foreign fundamentals constant ( ˆ A⋆
T = ˆ L⋆
T = ˆ A⋆ = ˆ β
⋆
= 0). Under these assumptions,
the comparative static eﬀects on ˆ v with two large countries are proportional to the ones
under autarky, with a factor of proportionality equal to 1/2.
12Note that ˆ A > 0 at ˆ AT = 0 relaxes the ﬁnancial constraints for a given total capital endowment and,
thereby, also reﬂects a more unequal distribution of wealth between workers to potential entrepreneurs.
30With large countries, a change in AT, LT, A or β induces direct (ﬁrst-order) eﬀects
on excess demands ˆ ζE and ˆ ζ
⋆
E and indirect (second-order) ones through ˆ v. Inserting the
solution ˆ v from (32) into (29) yields, under the adopted assumptions, total (ﬁrst- plus
second-order) comparative static eﬀects on domestic excess demand equal to
ˆ ζE = (1 − 1/2)  
 
εZAT   ˆ AT − εZL   ˆ LT − εZA   ˆ A + εZβ   ˆ β
 
. (33)
In qualitative terms, the insights correspond to the case discussed in (29).
Proposition 4 (Comparative Advantage) Better investor protection and corporate
governance standards reﬂected in lower agency costs (lower β) and a higher equity ratio of
entrepreneurial ﬁrms (higher A) create a comparative advantage in innovative industries.
Small Open Economy: Under the adopted symmetry assumptions, the result in (33)
may easily be generalized to the case of an arbitrary number of J countries. In general,
we may write ˆ v = Ξ/(J   εZv) and ˆ ζE = (1 − 1/J)   Ξ, where Ξ ≡ εZAT   ˆ AT − εZL   ˆ LT −
εZA   ˆ A + εZβ   ˆ β. The second-order eﬀects of changes in domestic fundamentals through
ˆ v become less important as the number of countries grows. For a small open economy,
we obtain lim J→∞ˆ ζE = Ξ. The magnitude of the comparative static eﬀects is larger in
a small open economy than with a ﬁnite number of large countries since the dampening
second-order world market price eﬀects do not materialize.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides an analysis of the role of endogenous ﬁnancial constraints on the ex-
tensive margin of ﬁrm activity and international trade. We consider economies with two
industries, a standard and an innovative sector. Firms in the standard sector are sym-
metric, ﬁnancially unconstrained and use capital intensively. Companies in the innovative
sector are heterogeneous with regard to productivity and crucially depend on the man-
agerial input of the founder. Entrepreneurs of innovative ﬁrms demand more capital than
31they own and have to rely on external ﬁnancing through (perfectly competitive) banks.
Since managerial eﬀort is not verifyable, entrepreneurs and banks cannot write contracts
to avoid moral hazard. To prevent managerial misbehavior, entrepreneurs must keep a
suﬃciently large ﬁnancial interest in the ﬁrm which limits pledgeable income and debt
capacity. As a result of these agency costs, some marginal ﬁrms with positive net present
value will be denied external funding in equilibrium, thereby limiting the expansion of
innovative industries.
The analysis brings about two novel fundamental parameters determining ﬁnancial
constraints, ﬁrm entry, and international trade simultaneously: an innovative ﬁrm’s eq-
uity ratio (as a measure of ﬁnancial robustness) and the extent of agency costs. Lower
agency costs relax the ﬁnancial constraint by raising an innovative ﬁrm’s pledgeable proﬁt
and debt capacity. A higher equity ratio reduces the need for external funding so that
even a lower pledgeable proﬁt suﬃces to repay debt. Both fundamentals facilitate the
ﬁnancing of ﬁrms with relatively low productivity but still positive net present value and
thereby support the expansion of innovative industries. We have thereby illustrated how
fundamental parameters of corporate ﬁnance aﬀect core theorems in international trade
such as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the Rybczinsky theorem, and the law of com-
parative advantage. We hope that some of the insights will prove useful in subsequent
empirical work in international economics.
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